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Chapter V Regulation 9 of the SOLAS Convention, annexed for reference, requires           
contracting governments to provide hydrographic services. Many signatories cannot              
provide these unaided. This is despite the fact that new cruise ship itineraries and trade 
routes are being established in their waters for increasingly larger and deeper draught                
vessels. This article reviews a number of chart related casualties. These demonstrate that 
no chart, paper or digital, is infallible. This emphasizes the urgent need for new and better 
hydrographic data collection in some key oceanic areas. Potential innovative solutions for 
data acquisition and hydrographic capacity building strategies are considered. 
 
La règle 9 du chapitre V de la convention pour la sauvegarde de la vie humaine en mer 
(SOLAS), annexée à titre de référence, impose aux gouvernements contractants de fournir 
des services hydrographiques. Un grand nombre de signataires ne peuvent fournir ces  
services sans aide. Et ce, en dépit du fait que de nouvelles routes commerciales et de  
nouveaux itinéraires pour les navires de croisière soient adoptées dans leurs eaux pour 
des navires de plus en plus grands et aux tirants d’eau de plus en plus importants.  Cet 
article examine un certain nombre de pertes liées aux cartes marines. Ces dernières                 
illustrent le fait qu’aucune carte, papier ou numérique, n’est infaillible. Ceci souligne le            
besoin urgent de recueillir des nouvelles données hydrographiques de meilleure qualité 
dans certaines zones océaniques clés. Des solutions potentiellement innovantes pour            
l’acquisition des données et des stratégies de renforcement des capacités hydrographiques 
sont examinées.  
El Capítulo V de la Regla 9 de la Convención SOLAS, que se adjunta como referencia, 
requiere que los gobiernos contratantes proporcionen servicios hidrográficos. Muchos           
signatarios se ven ante la imposibilidad de proporcionar dichos servicios sin ayuda. Esto            
sucede a pesar del hecho que se están estableciendo nuevos itinerarios para los buques 
de cruceros y que se están estableciendo rutas comerciales en sus aguas para buques 
cada vez mayores y de calado más profundo. Este artículo examina un número de           
accidentes desafortunados relacionados con las cartas. Estos demuestran que ninguna 
carta, ya sea de papel o digital, es infalible. Lo anterior destaca la urgente necesidad de 
contar con una colección de datos hidrográficos nueva y mejor en algunas zonas oceáni-
cas clave. Se consideran posibles soluciones innovadoras para la adquisición de datos y 
para nuevas estrategias de creación de capacidades hidrográficas. 
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 ENC Data Portrayal Issues 
 
The phased introduction of the mandatory Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention Electronic 
Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) 
carriage requirement, predicated the IHO Member 
States’ commitment to full Electronic Navigational 
Chart (ENC) coverage. This poses the question 
whether the status of hydrographic survey and 
charting worldwide and the quality of hydrographic 
data is adequate to support the emerging             
technology. This is a concern, given the aspiration 
of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) to 
implement the e-Navigation concept within the    
current decade. 
 
It raises a number of questions for chart producers 
and users alike. The chart catalogues of Interna-
tional Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) Member 
States reveal that, away from the main traffic 
routes and major port approaches, ENC must have 
been compiled from charts of limited utility for the 
needs of contemporary shipping.  This is com-
pounded by the unsatisfactory portrayal of data 
quality in ECDIS. In many cases ENC producers 
have resorted to use of the “Unassessed” symbol 
for this critical attribute. 
 
A review of the literature and the proceedings of 
the related IMO and IHO committees and working 
groups supports the contention that the presenta-
tion of ENC in ECDIS is capable of improvement. 
The evolution of ENC from the paper chart has 
resulted in the former inheriting the limitations of 
the latter. In the critical matter of enabling the user 
to assess the quality of bathymetric data, the ENC 
is frequently inferior to its predecessor. 
 
 Status of Hydrographic Surveys 
 
Table 1 indicates the extent of the data acquisition 
task facing even established hydrographic authori-
ties, if they are to meet the perceived demands on 
their products. It also draws attention to the need 
for those developing States, parties to the SOLAS 
Convention Chapter V Regulation 9 (SOLAS V/9), 
to meet their obligations for the provision of hydro-
graphic services. A significant number of coastal 
and Island States have signed up to SOLAS 
V/9 with no means of implementing it. This has 
produced a new and critical situation with regard to 
safe navigation.  
 
Under this regulation, which came into effect in 
2002, contracting governments undertake to exe-
cute hydrographic surveys, prepare, issue and  
update nautical charts and publications and ensure 
uniformity in their products and world-wide avail-
ability. These obligations must be based on the 
appropriate resolutions and recommendations of 
the IHO. 
Region Unsurveyed  
or requires better data 
(0-200m deep) 
Remarks 
SW Pacific >95%   
Polar regions >95%   
Caribbean >80%   
W. Africa >80%   
E. Africa >76% Includes Somalia 
W. Indian Ocean >73% Excludes Maldives 
Papua New Guinea >72%   
Australia >65%   
Greece >65%   
USA >40%   
UK >30%   
France >19%   
Table 1.  Examples of the status of Hydrographic Surveys 2013 (source: IHO C-55)  
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The International Hydrographic Bureau (IHB), as 
the Secretariat of the IHO, provides guidance,  
advice and support in all hydrographic areas, in 
particular to those countries interested in establish-
ing or expanding their hydrographic capabilities in 
order to fully satisfy the obligations of the new 
regulation. The IHO Capacity Building Strategy 
policy document was published in 2006 to provide 
guidance on the implementation of this remit. The 
strategy is currently under review as discussed 
later. 
 
The advent of deeper draught shipping has in-
creased the urgency for national programmes to 
review and upgrade coverage based on surveys 
carried out before the development of sidescan 
sonar and multi-beam echo sounder (MBES). The 
increasing tendency of cruise liners to seek new 
routes, anchorages, and port calls, has high-
lighted the need for more rigorous survey of areas 
which were originally explored in the nineteenth 
century. This is a major challenge for developing 
hydrographic services in the Caribbean, Indian 
Ocean and SW Pacific areas. 
 
The projected increase in commodity shipments to 
and from the emerging economies and the continu-
ing search for and exploitation of new mineral de-
posits is having similar consequences elsewhere 
e.g. Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the South 
China Sea. Significantly there is no information 
available on the status of hydrographic surveying 
in Indonesia or the disputed Paracel and Spratly 
Islands in the South China Sea. 
  
An example of some of the work needed else-
where, is that for updating the 1970’s single beam 
echo sounder surveys of the Malacca Strait. This 
has been requested by the International Chamber 
of Shipping (ICS). It would significantly enhance 
the utility of the proposed Malacca and Singapore 
Straits Marine Electronic Highway. Commercial 
survey companies have the capacity to undertake 
the work if funding is forthcoming.  
 
Deeper Ships Dangerous Seas 
 
Table 2 shows the progressive increase in the size 
of vessels. 
Table 2.  Progressive increase in the size of vessels. The dimensions of those now at sea and on  order, reflect 
the shipping industry’s response to changing operational and trading patterns. 
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Contemporary vessel draughts have dictated the 
survey and charting requirements and the depth 
criteria for the definition of a dangerous wreck. For 
UKHO this is currently 28m (15 fathoms). Until 
1960 it was only 14.6m (8 fathoms). 
 
Despite a steady increase in the length of cruise 
ships the draught of the current vessels in service 
has not increased proportionately and averages 
8.4m. The increased length will mean that unless 
host ports can expand and deepen berthing areas 
and approach channels, more attention will need to 
be given to surveying roadstead anchorages. An 




Cruise ships are now venturing into increasingly 
remote and poorly charted areas such as the Polar 
Regions, SW Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Carib-
bean. Itineraries that seek to provide optimum  
passenger experience could have unintended  
consequences. 
 
 Cruise Ship Crashes  
 
An example of what such ventures may lead to 
occurred in January 1971 when the French pas-
senger liner Antilles (l.o.a.183m, beam 24.4m and 
draught 8m), recently converted into a cruise ship, 
on passage from La Guaria in Venezuela to Barba-
dos, struck an uncharted reef half a mile off the 
NW coast of Mustique in the passage which           
separates that island from Baliceaux in the          
Grenadine Islands. As the ship proceeded at a 
speed of 16 knots, the impact caused her to break 
in two, catch fire and become a total loss.  
 
The passage being attempted was through appar-
ently open water, with charted depths of 13 and 16 
metres some 3½ cables (640m) wide, between two 
rock outcrops, in a coral and reef-strewn area last 
surveyed in the 19th century. This followed an  
alteration to the planned voyage. It was authorised 
by the master in order, as the subsequent legal 
proceedings revealed, 'to provide his passengers 
with a better look at this enchanting isle’ and was 
consistent with his desire to implement the 
Owner's policy of making Antilles' cruises enter-
taining and unique. 
 
Two decades later another ocean liner undertaking 
a cruise provided a further example of the danger 
involved in such a vessel operating in inshore wa-
ters.  In August 1992, Queen Elizabeth 2  (l.o.a. 
294m ((63 ft), beam 32m (105 ft), draught 9.85m 
(32 ft)) grounded on uncharted and previously un-
surveyed rocks to the south of Cuttyhunk Island, 
off the east coast of the USA. She was then on 
passage from Martha's Vineyard to New York. In 
trying to make up time for an ETA at her next port 
of call, speed was increased to about 25 knots. 
This was not warranted by the general depth of 
water and induced 4 feet of squat. Consequently 
the vessel grounded on rocks which a subsequent 
survey found to have a least depth of 33 and 34 
feet. The charted least depth in the vicinity was 39 
feet; this was confirmed by the re-survey. The na-
ture of the seabed was shown as rock. 
 
The owners of the QE2 sued the USA for                 
negligence on the part of the charting authority for 
failing to carry out a more thorough hydrographic 
survey of the area. In particular, they claimed that 
the 39 foot sounding had not been examined. The 
charting authority stated that there was no reason 
to develop the 39 foot sounding further because it 
was outside the normal shipping lanes and that in 
1939, when the area had last been surveyed, large 
vessels such as the QE2 never frequented those 
waters. The court accepted this argument and  
dismissed the claim.  
 
In April 2000, the “Adventure” cruise ship World 
Discoverer (l.o.a. 87m, beam 15m, draught 4.57m) 
grounded on a large allegedly uncharted rock or 
Figure 1.  Antigua 2011 - Full seafloor coverage of         
St John’s Harbour and St John’s Roads (last surveyed in 
1849) 
 
Source UKHO [1] presentation to Meso-American and                 
Caribbean Hydrographic Commission. 
Extract from Admiralty Chart 2065 © Crown Copyright and/or 
database rights. Reproduced by permission of the Controller of 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and the UK Hydrographic Office 
(www.ukho.gov.uk) 
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reef in Sandfly Passage, Solomon Islands. The 
ship was fatally holed and the master beached her 
in Roderick Dhow Bay, where the hulk remains. 
Neither the Australian Hydrographic Service nor 
the UK Hydrographic Office, the Primary Charting 
Authority, has any record of the incident. The 
stranded wreck of World Discover is clearly visible 
on Google Earth, but is not shown on the latest 
(2012) edition of chart BA 1713. The Pacific Island 
Pilot, current at the date of the incident, advises 
that; “Deep-draught vessels should not attempt the 
passage owing to the reefs in the N entrance.” The 
latest (2007) edition of the Pilot directs vessels 
west of Mid Reef; passing clear of the 9.1m patch. 
This remains the least depth shown in the passage 
other than the reef itself. 
 
 Uncharted Rock 
 
Such dangers also exist for large cargo vessels           
navigating in poorly charted waters to service the 
exploitation of newly-found mineral resources. A 
prime example occurred in late 2010. The bulk           
carrier Noble Hawk (l.o.a.190m (623 ft), beam 33m 
(108 ft), draught 12.5m (41 ft)), starting a passage 
to China from Pulau Mabuli on Halmahera Island in 
Eastern Indonesia, grounded on an uncharted 5m 
(16 ft) shoal. The surrounding depths were 29 to 
32 fms (53 to 58m). Her course lay across Teluk 
Buli which is much encumbered with islets, reefs 
and shoals. She was loaded with nickel ore              
embarked from a berthing facility somewhere on 
the coast of the bay, which does not seem to have 
been charted. However, jetties with vessels along-
side and a large ship offshore can be seen on 




Early in 2012 the Indonesian Navy Hydrographic 
Service (DISHIDROS) carried out a single beam 
and sidescan sonar survey of the grounding site 
and found a least depth of 3m (10 feet) and an 
adjacent depth of 15.3m (8fm 2 feet) in general 
depths of 50m (27fms). Mindful of the significant 
activity of large cruise ships and bulk carriers in 
these waters, DISHIDROS recommended the        
installation of a navigation beacon on the feature. It 
is uncertain whether or not this recommendation 
has yet been acted upon. 
 
 Oceanic Dangers 
 
The significant draughts in the Table 2 are those of 
the large cargo vessels which now exceed 17m 
and are as much as 24.5m. New Panamax vessels 
transiting the Caribbean may not be able to do so 
with the same confidence as their predecessors. 
Elsewhere ULCC and large bulk carriers are          
vulnerable to an encounter with an uncharted          
seamount rising close to the surface. In the deep 
areas of the ocean, most mariners consider that 
there is little chance of such a mishap. Unfortu-
nately, this is a misconception. 
 
In 1973 the cargo ship Muirfield, with a draught of 
16m, was on passage from the Cape of Good 
Hope to Selat Sunda. There was a 2-3m swell     
running when she struck the top of a seamount, 75 
Figure 3. Sketch map derived from Chart BA 2788 
showing position of grounding in relation to Noble 
Hawk’s departure point, adjacent depths and shoal  
areas.  
Figure 2. Portion of chart BA 1713 current at the time 
of the grounding showing the shoals in the northern 
entrance to Sandfly passage, on which it is presumed 
World Discover struck and her final resting place in 
Roderick Dhu Bay. [2].  
 
Extract from Admiralty Chart 1713 © Crown Copyright and/or 
database rights. Reproduced by permission of the Controller 
of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and the UK Hydrographic 
Office (www.ukho.gov.uk) 
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miles south west of the Cocos Islands. A subse-
quent survey showed this to be half a mile in         
extent; with a least depth of 18m in charted depths 
of over 5,000 metres. Two further examples of 
navigationally significant seamounts, discovered in 
the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean, include Vema 
Seamount (with a charted depth of 11 metres - 
about 1,000 km west-north-west of Cape Town) 
and Walters Shoal Seamount (with a charted depth 
of 15 metres - about 400 nautical miles south of 
Madagascar). These seamounts rise up from 
ocean depths of about 4,000 and 2,000 metres 
respectively. 
 
More than 90% of all seamounts greater than 1km 
in height (estimated to be more than100,000) are 
unobserved by either ship soundings or satellite 
gravity [3]. This observation is consistent with the 
statement in IHO publication C-55 that renewed 
attention needs to be given to the disproving of 
vigias especially adjacent to the maritime shipping 
routes in the Pacific and adjacent seas. The dan-
ger to submarine navigation is self evident. This is 
exemplified by the incident involving a nuclear 
powered submarine of the US Pacific fleet that 
collided with a seamount about 364 nautical miles 
southeast of Guam. 
 
The submarine was travelling at maximum speed 
at a depth of 525 feet (160 m). The seamount that 
she struck did not appear on the chart in use at the 
time of the accident. Other charts available for use 
showed an area of "discoloured water", an indica-
tion of the probable presence of a seamount. The 
US Navy investigation [4] determined that informa-
tion regarding the seamount should have been 
transferred to the charts in use; particularly given 
the relatively uncharted nature of the ocean area 
that was being transited and that the failure to do 
so represented a failure to follow proper proce-
dures. Fortunately the pressure hull was not 
breached enabling the submarine to surface and 
be escorted to Guam for temporary repairs. 
 
 Caveat Navigator 
 
This submarine accident is indicative of the fact 
that the failure to make proper use of limited 
charted information, whether on paper or a screen, 
applies as much to the bridge personnel of naval 
vessels as to those of commercial vessels. The 
unsatisfactory portrayal of the reliability of charted 
information in ECDIS means even more caution 
needs to be currently exercised by mariners when 
away from regular routes. Two further examples, 
although separated by more than 40 years, are 
pertinent to this general discussion.  
In June 1970 a fleet auxiliary vessel of the Royal 
Navy, the tanker Ennerdale, (l.o.a. 744 ft (227m), 
beam 98 ft (30m), draught 40 ft (12m)) struck a 
rock pinnacle about 8 miles NNE of Port Victoria in 
the Seychelles.  This opened up her starboard 
side, causing her to heel over and settle on the 
seabed.  The pinnacle, which was charted at 9fms 
(16.5m), lay adjacent to a 10fm sounding in gen-
eral depths of 13 to 16fms.  The vessel, travelling 
at 12kts, was crossing a line of pinnacles and islet 
outcrops which extend north eastwards from the 
north tip of the Island of Mahé within the 20 fathom 
line. 
 
The chart in use was compiled from a 19th century 
(lead line) survey, as clearly stated in the title 
block. Considering this fact the least depth of water 
over the pinnacle (subsequently established at 
10.8m (35ft)) may well not have been shown on 
the chart in use.  However, there was sufficient 
indication on the chart that shoaler water may well 
have existed in the vicinity. The prime cause of the 
accident, leading to a total loss of the vessel, was 
poor execution of the navigational departure plan, 
which would otherwise have taken the vessel clear 
of the danger. 
 
A far more recent incident took place in January 
2013, when a mine counter-measures vessel USS 
Guardian (l.o.a. 68m (224 ft), beam 12m (39 ft), 
draught 4m (13 ft)) ran aground on Tubbataha reef 
in the Sulu Sea. On the coastal scale Digital           
Nautical Chart (DNC) being used the reef was  
positioned 8 miles to the east of its correct             
position, in contradiction to the general scale DNC 
and the standard paper chart. Unfortunately, the 
approved voyage plan in the Voyage Management 
System used the coastal DNC and no  attempt was 
made to investigate the discrepancy. This decision 
was based on the supposition that it was well 
known 'that general charts are inaccurate', a        
remark which, aided by the bridge team's prefer-
ence to rely on the DNC rather than to take correc-
tive action when a light on the reef was raised,     
resulted in the total loss of the ship. 
 
The focus for future survey effort: 
some examples 
 
 Traffic Routing 
 
Traffic surveys using the satellite Automatic Identi-
fication System (AIS) can provide preliminary              
indications of where future data acquisition effort 
might need to focus. This can be augmented in 
consultation with the IMO and representative                  
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industry bodies such as, the International Chamber 
of Shipping (ICS), the International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), the 
International Association of Dry Cargo 
(INTERCARGO), and the Baltic and International 
Maritime Council (BIMCO). 
 
 
In Figure 4, AIS data marks the route through 
Papua New Guinea waters from Eastern Australian 




Papua New Guinea is experiencing a marked 
increase in the volume of international ship traffic 
through its waters. It is estimated that some 7,360 
ships transited its waters in 2012. The majority of 
this traffic was to and from ports on the eastern 
seaboard of Australia. There are growing risks to 
the safety of navigation and protection of the  
sensitive marine environment associated with this 
increasing traffic. Areas of particular concern are 
Jomard Entrance and the area east of Rossel 
Island. However, the quality (Zone of Confidence 
or ZOC) of the hydrographic surveys in the 
Jomard Entrance area is category "C". Therefore, 
it would be necessary to improve hydrographic 
information available for the area, before any ship 
routeing systems are established.  
 
C-55 notes that the banks and vigias near                   
Coetivy Island (Seychelles) lie on the flanks of a 
trans-ocean sea-lane and require thorough            
examination. This route is used by ships transiting 
the Mozambique Channel and turning eastward 
north of Madagascar. Similarly surveys are         
required south of Mauritius as ships divert              
eastwards from the shortest route to the Gulf to 
avoid pirates as evident from Figure 5.  
 
The French Hydrographic Service (SHOM)             
completed a route survey in the Mozambique 
Channel in 2010 for the Western Indian Ocean 
(WIO) Marine Highway. SHOM is deploying a            
survey vessel to the Indian Ocean again in 2014 
and there is mention of a survey en-route of a  
possible gap (unspecified) in the Highway. Recent 
(2012) Satellite AIS data (refer Figure 5) clearly 
shows where survey priorities should lie. Even 
though the situation in the Mozambique Channel is 
probably understated as vessels frequently turn off 
their AIS to avoid revealing their position to pirates.  
 
Ships diverting south of Mauritius now pass closer 
to that island to embark or disembark security            
personnel. The pattern of risk to the region’s      
ecosystems has therefore changed, increasing the 
exposure of the south coast of Madagascar,            
Mauritius, Rodrigues and the Maldives. 
 
In hindsight the route survey in the Mozambique 
Channel was perhaps not the best use of limited 
deep water multibeam survey resources. The WIO 
Marine Highway Development (MHD) project          
participants’ proposal to establish a new recom-
mended route for all ships in the Mozambique 
Channel was rejected by IMO Member Sates. The 
route would have been approximately 1,000 miles 
long. The compelling need for the measure was 
Figure 4. Ship traffic in the vicinity of Jomard               
Entrance, Papua New Guinea 
 
Taken from NAV 59/INF.3 31 May 2013 [5] 
Extract of Chart Aus 4621 Copyright Commonwealth of               
Australia (2011).  Used with permission of the Australian            
Hydrographic Service. 
Figure 5. Satellite AIS data in the WIO Marine  
Highway Development area 
 
Image from presentation by South African Marine Safety 
Agency (SAMSA) on the results of the Global Environ-
mental Facility (GEF) - Western Indian Ocean Marine High-
way Development and Coastal and Marine Contamination 
Prevention Project. 
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unclear. No statistical evidence had been provided 
regarding shipping casualties or near misses. This 
omission made it very difficult to quantify the antici-
pated benefit that the proposal might have            
delivered. The route would have needlessly denied 
the full use of a wide deep water channel. It was 
felt that concentrating shipping into restricted lanes 
could potentially have increased the risk of            
collision. 
 
The refusal of the IMO to designate a recom-
mended route through the Mozambique Channel 
could have unintended consequences for any fu-
ture international effort to focus survey effort on 
routes rather than the traditional area sur-
veys.  Although the Mozambique Channel was not 
a typical case, the World Bank’s assessment [6] of 
the WIO MHD project found that ‘the relevance of 
the marine highway concept to increase the safety 
and efficiency of navigation in the Mozambique 
Channel is questionable’ and that ‘The Mozam-
bique Channel is not appropriate for such a 
scheme for two reasons: it is wide (400 km wide at 
the narrowest point), and the density of the traffic 
is relatively low’.    
 
 Need and Risk Assessment 
 
The figures used to determine percentages of the 
seas and oceans remaining poorly charted or not 
at all, while alarming, are perhaps unrepresenta-
tive of the practical situation. Rather what is 
needed is a figure for that portion of useable sea 
space suitable for shipping that is in urgent need of 
survey. As a starting point one might refer to the 
routes in UKHO’s NP136 (Ocean Passages for the 
World). An example of which is given in Figure 6. 
Details of current and potential cruise ship destina-
tions can be sought from operators. Analysis is 
required of the likely demands for updated charts 
to support emerging new trading patterns. These 
will be associated with developing exploitation and 
shipment of mineral resources and hydro carbons 
and with consumer demand and export growth in 
the emerging economies of this decade and           
beyond. 
 
It should not be automatically assumed that all 
charts compiled from single beam echo sounder 
surveys are no longer fit for purpose. Particularly if 
used with appropriate discernment and where  
relevant, complemented by modern aids to              
collision avoidance such as masthead CCTV and 
forward looking sonar. An alternative to the latter in 
inshore tropical waters and when entering and 
leaving harbour, might be a bow lookout with           
Polaroid glasses. Such measures, complementing 
the existing careful and informed appraisal of           
legacy data by Hydrographic Offices, could well 
result in some reduction in the perceived magni-
tude of the re-survey requirement. 
Figure 6. Ocean routes in the Western Indian Ocean marine Highway Development 
project area 
 
Source: Admiralty Ocean Passages for the World NP136 4th Edition. Extract from Admiralty 
Chart 4071 © Crown Copyright. Reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office and the UK Hydrographic Office (www.ukho.gov.uk).  
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For example, an enduring Hydrography Risk           
Assessment Framework [7], such as that estab-
lished for a South West Pacific maritime infrastruc-
ture comprises the following: 
 
a) A Regional Risk Assessment; 
b) An Economic Impact Analysis; and 
c) A Regional Risk Assessment Implementation 
Plan and funding mechanism agreed by          
donors/key stakeholders 
 
This assessment process seems to be a pragmatic 
and commercially relevant method to prioritise the 
survey needs of the Small Island Developing 
States, scattered throughout the region. It is nota-
ble that this initiative is led not by a Hydrographic 
Office; but by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Aid Programme.  
 
 Filling in the White Space 
 
The President of the Directing Committee of the 
IHB acknowledges that alternatives to the deploy-
ment of survey ships must be found for “Filling in 
the White Space on Charts and Ocean Maps” [8]. 
This is in the interest not only of safety of naviga-
tion but to service the wider blue economy.  
Against this background, any viable alternative 
methods of obtaining suitable depth information in 
a cost effective and reliable manner should be      
investigated and promoted. 
 
 Satellite Derived Bathymetry 
 
In the opinion of the IHB [9], shallow water bathym-
etry derived from multi-spectral imagery, should be 
considered as a potential technology for obtaining 
bathymetry for charting purposes in areas where 
existing surveys are poor or non-existent. Bathy-
metric and other useful environmental data can be 
derived extremely cost effectively by this means. 
However, the information content of these data 
must be well understood and not regarded as a 
replacement for acoustic, Light Detection and 
Ranging (LiDAR) or other high resolution surveying 
sensors. 
 
Over the past decade, there have been significant 
advances in the methods used to derive bathym-
etry from multi-spectral satellite imagery. It is now 
acknowledged that Satellite Derived Bathymetry 
(SDB) has the potential to make substantial          
improvements to otherwise inadequate charts. It 
can provide useful hydrographic data in areas 
where existing charting is based on little or no              
hydrographic surveying and there is little prospect 
of conventional surveys being conducted in the 
reasonable future.  
 Crowd Sourcing 
 
Crowd sourced bathymetric (CSB) data from ships 
of opportunity and recreational vessels can be 
used to check and supplement SDB; as well as 
provide inshore and ocean bathymetry independ-
ently. Currently there are issues about data quality, 
reliability and chart producers’ liability. The IHB is 
being invited to address these by producing           
standards and methods of qualifying and identify-
ing CSB data if used for charting inshore waters. 
  
Passage soundings have been and remain a           
useful source of information for the nautical            
cartographer and ocean mapper. CSB updates this           
process and UKHO is a major participant in CSB 
trials in Antarctica [10]. Participating cruise ships,           
belonging to the International Association of         
Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO), have been fitted 
with the ARGUS CSB system which plugs into the 
vessel’s navigation system and echo sounder. 
Data is recorded and down loaded virtually autono-
mously with minimal crew involvement. 
 
Successful surveys have also been carried out in 
uncharted Antarctic waters by an IAATO yacht 
Xplore [11], provided with survey systems and with 
a SHOM hydrographer embarked. The results 
were of charting quality. IAATO has clearly identi-
fied the potential for suitably equipped yachts and 
cruise ship tenders to complement the survey          
efforts of government vessels, particularly in            
inshore waters. Trials with a hydrographic data 
logger are taking place this year under an IHB/
Professional Yachting Association (PYA) initiative. 
The ideal would be to see the system installed in 
every professionally crewed ship. 
 
 
Figure 7. Luxury yacht providing Antarctic cruises 
Source IAATO presentation to Hydrographic Commission 
on Antarctica Meeting December 2013  
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 Invisible Data 
 
Large bathymetric data sets from both commercial 
and scientific sources remain inaccessible to chart-
ing authorities for various reasons. A system 
needs to be devised which at least acknowledges 
that such data exists and might in time become 
generally available; if necessary at a price. This 
would certainly not equate to the cost of a repeat 
survey. 
 
Coastal States should always endeavour to get 
data from Hydrographic Surveys and Marine           
Scientific Research conducted within their EEZ. 
This is not always straight forward, as interpreta-
tion of the UNCLOS provisions concerning the      
collection of marine scientific data and Hydro-
graphic Surveying is a contentious area. Addition-
ally, as C-55 states; “… failure to apply IHO S-44 
criteria in Marine Scientific Research and offshore 
industrial surveys leads to the loss of opportunity 
data for SOLAS charting purposes”. 
 
Meeting the SOLAS V/9 Challenge  
 
 IHO Initiatives 
 
The IHB’s response to its mandate under SOLAS 
V/9 was to establish a Capacity Building Commit-
tee (CBC), which first met in 2003. This is now the 
Capacity Building Sub-Committee (CBSC) of the 
Inter-Regional Coordination Committee (IRCC). 
The CBC replaced the previous Technical Assis-
tance Coordination Committee whose remit was 
narrowly focused on specific education, training 
and limited equipment provision. The CBC drew up 
the more broadly based Capacity Building Strategy 
of the IHO (published in 2006). This better re-
flected the IHO’s contribution to safety of naviga-
tion as complementing that of IMO and the Interna-
tional Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA). 
At the last International Hydrographic Conference 
(IHC) in 2012 the CSBC was tasked to review the 
strategy and report to Member States at the          
Extraordinary IHC in October 2014. This injunction 
perhaps reflects the fact that earlier capacity            
building initiatives have been unavailing and           
unsustainable. It is now recognised that these did 
not engage top decision makers; but rather          
assumed that Hydrography per se was self-
evidently beneficial to the national well being. That 
said, reports from the IHO Technical Visits to the 
Caribbean region in 2006 and subsequent ones to 
E Africa, Madagascar, Seychelles and Mauritius in 
2011/12 clearly reflect a new approach. 
 
The conclusion [12] from the comprehensive IHO 
technical assessment visits to the Caribbean         
region in 2006 bears setting out in full in the            
context of this discussion. It exemplifies the               
challenge confronting all developing coastal States 
bordering busy seaways and included in the             
itineraries of cruise ship operators. 
  
“This mission covered a sea area of immense 
international and regional significance. It          
encompassed many of the main passages 
from  the Atlantic into the Caribbean and          
onwards to the Gulf of Mexico and Panama 
Canal. The countries bordering these strategic 
seaways are small island states or dependen-
cies dealing with a multitude of challenges to 
good governance with limited financial and 
human resources. Their coastal waters are 
traversed by some of the biggest passenger-
carrying vessels in the world, yet a significant 
percentage of those waters have not been 
surveyed since the nineteenth century. It is 
imperative that the countries visited are as-
sisted to implement appropriate and sustain-
able arrangements to meet their obligations 
under SOLAS Chapter V.” 
 
Subsequent initiatives by the member States of the 
Regional Hydrographic Commission (RHC), in          
cooperation with UKHO and NOAA have made 
some advances in improving charting and other 
Marine Safety Information (MSI) services, in         
particular around Antigua, British Virgin Islands 
and in Belize/Honduras. This suggests that the 
revised strategy of staged and focused technical 
assistance and engagement of top decision            
makers is starting to pay off. Despite this improve-
ment, efforts to establish effective MSI capabilities 
remain heavily dependent on outside technical 
assistance and responsible national agencies        
continue to be under-resourced. 
 
There is a similar pattern in the waters of East         
Africa and the West Indian Ocean where US, India 
and France are undertaking surveys and providing 
technical assistance. A series of IHO Technical 
visits in 2011 and 2012 established that local MSI 
capability is limited and that Capacity Building (CB) 
needs a regional component. There was a consen-
sus among visit teams that pooling of survey 
equipment for deployment in craft of opportunity 
could be beneficial.  
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 Non-compliance with SOLAS V/9 
 
Coastal States, in the regions identified in C-55 as 
poorly charted, are generally signatories to the 
SOLAS Convention, but do not appear to have 
accepted their obligations for provision of Hydro-
graphic Services. Many have invested in offshore 
surveys and costly technical and legal advice to 
establish entitlement to an extended continental 
shelf (ECS) beyond 200M. This is understandable 
and was driven by the time limit imposed on sub-
missions as well as the prospect of gaining access 
to additional seabed resources. The SOLAS         
requirement to ensure the safety of navigation 
within existing maritime zones has clearly not              
engaged decision makers to the same extent. In 
most cases the momentum generated by the ECS 
submission process and the raising of aware-
ness of maritime matters was not sustained.          
Consequently it did not translate into the neces-
sary government actions required to fulfil national 
SOLAS obligations despite attempts by donor 
agencies to demonstrate the connection. 
 
The unfortunate reality has been that donor funded 
projects have rarely been sustainable. Boats and 
equipment have gradually fallen victim to the         
climate and lack of maintenance. Trained person-
nel have moved on, unable to fully exercise their 
new-found skills. Accessory funding has not been 
forthcoming and most projects focused on techni-
cal provision rather than institution strengthening 
and encouraging top level government support. 
Recipients have failed to take ownership of           
projects or to shoulder any financial burden. 
 
 Concerted Action by International         
Organisations 
 
The need for collective action between all organi-
sations with responsibility for safety of life at sea 
and the protection of the marine environment has 
now been recognised. The latter, more than the 
potential for loss of life or property, seems to at-
tract the attention of Coastal States’ governments 
and funding agencies. Hence the Global Environ-
mental Facility was persuaded to finance both the 
Malacca and Singapore Straits and WIO Marine 
Highways demonstrations to minimise the risk of 
collision involving the VLCC and other vessels 
constrained by size, transiting those waters.  
 
At the last International Hydrographic Conference 
in 2012, it was agreed that IHO member States 
should commit to working with IMO Member States 
to promote the need for improved hydrographic 
survey and nautical charting services as required 
by SOLAS V/ 9 and to provide support through the 
respective IHO and IMO capacity building          
programmes. The IHB has since held a Capacity 
Building coordination meeting with IMO, IOC, 
WMO, IALA and others and has called particular 
attention of Regional Hydrographic Commissions 
(RHC) to the initiation of the IALA World Wide 
Academy [13]. The objectives of the Academy un-
der the headings of Awareness, Assessment, 
Analysis and Actions serve as a template for          
capacity building to which the IHO subscribes in its 
own capacity building strategy. 
 
At the 2013 meeting of the CSBC the UK, drawing 
on findings from recent meetings of those RHC for 
which it is CB co-ordinator and noting the dramatic 
increase in demand for CB made the following 
points: 
 
a) That initial assessments of CB requirements 
be jointly compiled as one ‘Country Profile’ 
by IMO, IALA and IHO; 
 
b) That both IHO and IALA should become part 
of the team for the IMO Member State Audit 
Scheme; 
 
c) The need for a top down approach; 
 
d) Acknowledgement that IHO member States 
should derive CB benefits as well as               
contributing to the needs of non-members.  
 
 Risk Assessment – Economic Benefit  
 
New Zealand has developed a risk assessment 
and cost benefit methodology to enable informed 
Figure 8. Antigua and Barbuda Coastguard craft 
with MBES and a positioning and motion sensing 
system temporarily fitted 
 
Source UKHO presentation to Meso American and Carib-
bean Hydrographic Commission 2011 
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decision making about investment in improving 
charting and MSI for Island States in the SW         
Pacific. This seems to be a very sensible approach 
and much more likely to result in Government,    
Donor and Stakeholder engagement. An initial              
assessment of through traffic, local trading pat-
terns and the increasing number of cruise ship    
visits in Vanuatu (New Hebrides), has concluded 
that updating of the charts and improvements to 
and/or refurbishment of aids to navigation would 
yield significant economic benefit. As a result a 
survey programme has been initiated and work is 
currently in progress. 
 
 Industry co-operation 
 
As an example Carnival Australia (the largest 
cruise ship operator in the Pacific) is to develop a 
public-private partnership that aims to foster               
linkages between the cruise ship industry and local 
economic development opportunities. Carnival has 
identified the need for improved maritime safety 
information (MSI) and that the major barrier to             
expansion of cruise ship activity in Vanuatu, Tonga 
and Fiji is the lack of accurate and adequate     
charting. 
 
The above approaches may well be something that 
should be looked at in the Caribbean. It is encour-
aging to note that in 2011 a Marine Superintendent 
from a Cruise Ship operator participated in a meet-
ing of the RHC. The company’s ships are over 
1,000 feet (305m) in length with a draught of 27 
feet (8.2m) and carry a total of 4,000 passengers 
and crew. Surveys such as those of St John’s Anti-
gua cited earlier (see Figure 1) are clearly a           
response to the needs of such vessels. 
 
The IHO has for some time encouraged coopera-
tion with industry and representatives of commer-
cial survey companies and equipment manufactur-
ers have enjoyed observer status at meetings of 
IHO committees, Working Groups and RHC. They 
have also participated in workshops and training 
courses. Suggestions have been put to the IHO 
Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee for an   
industry contribution to the successful implementa-
tion of an enduring Capacity Building policy. These 
include exploiting the industry’s association with 
donor organisations, full participation in education 
and training provision, addressing the issue of                
sustainability and ultimately collaborating with            
developing States in the identification of survey 
needs, procurement of survey services and the 
design and execution of surveys. 
 
 Too much technology 
 
In the digital age there seems to be a perception 
that developing countries can bypass the essential 
learning curve of traditional survey and cartogra-
phy and move directly to multibeam E/S surveys 
and ENC production. This was an unrealised             
expectation of the Hydrographic and Maritime 
Safety Information (MSI) components of the WIO 
Marine Highway Development Project. There is 
concern even in established Hydrographic Offices, 
that the automation of many critical cartographic 
functions could adversely affect product quality. 
 
In order to meet the IHO commitment to full ENC 
coverage it is considered that CB has been 
skewed towards training in ENC production. This is 
phase 3 of the IHO CB strategy. It should have 
been preceded by enabling the collection and          
circulation of nautical information, necessary to 
maintain existing charts and publications up to 
date. This then would be followed by the creation 
of a surveying capability. The feasibility of                
implementing phase 3 is acknowledged to be 
questionable. Bi-lateral agreements for charting 
can provide easier solutions in production and    
distribution of ENC through Regional Electronic 
Chart Coordination Centres. 
 
Conclusions 
The unsatisfactory state of global hydrographic 
data and resulting poor quality of global charting 
undermines the improvements to the safety of 
navigation anticipated from ECDIS. It will require 
concerted action from all coastal and Island States 
Parties to the SOLAS convention to remedy this. 
For many signatories to the convention, the need 
to honour their undertakings for the provision of 
hydrographic services is not a high priority. There 
are more urgent demands on slender human and 
financial resources. Any attempt to create a global 
network of indigenous cartographic and hydro-
graphic entities for the production of even usage 
band 5 and 6 ENC, is unlikely attract the required 
support from governments. The current review of 
the IHO Capacity Building strategy is therefore 
welcomed. 
The decline in national hydrographic survey assets 
is permanent. A mechanism needs to be found to 
harness the resources of the commercial sector to 
fill the gap. The successful outcome from the             
Introduction to Hydrographic Surveying and Nauti-
cal Charting training course in Antigua (see Figure 
1) showed what could be achieved in this respect. 
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The wider use of SDB could prove cost effect and 
attractive to cash strapped administrations, particu-
larly in many small-island developing States. CSB 
also has merit as in Antarctica and to verify SDB 
elsewhere. Gravity anomalies inferred from            
satellite altimetry can assist in the eradication or 
confirmation of vigias as potential dangers on 
ocean routes. 
It is never going to be possible to fill in all the 
“white spaces” on the charts and consequently a 
rigorous and informed analysis of need and alloca-
tion of survey resources is necessary. The              
prototype Hydrographic Risk Assessment method-
ology developed by New Zealand to assist             
decision makers to prioritise hydrographic surveys 
is one solution to this problem. The WIO Marine 
Highway Development Project was an ambitious 
attempt to focus survey effort; but was only            
partially successful. The hydrographic component 
failed to identify the actual rather than the               
perceived route survey requirements. Increasingly, 
as in Australia and Oceania, the shipping industry 
is likely to have to accept more routing restrictions. 
This will place the onus on the littoral states to    
install and maintain the necessary aids to naviga-
tion and MSI infrastructure. 
The implementation of SOLAS Chapter V concerns 
all aspects of navigational safety; of which the 
maintenance of nautical charts and publications 
and the dissemination of safety critical navigational               
information is but one. It is therefore essential that 
all international bodies with responsibilities for 
oversight of safe navigation coordinate their              
regulatory, promotional and mentoring activities. 
This is particularly important when raising               
awareness of maritime safety issues with govern-
ments and funding agencies. Past attempts at     
capacity building have been largely unavailing            
because recipient countries have not taken owner-
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